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Abstract
China’s urban labor market has been under growing pressure to meet the large job
demands that are resulting from the Economic System Reform. For more than three
decades during the Centrally Planned System, Chinese urban citizens have been
guaranteed jobs by the government. Now, the crisis in the labor market might be a
source of social unrest. Balancing the urban labor supply and demand has been
considered not only an economic issue but also a political challenge. Therefore, a high
quality forecast that aims at telling the labor supply dynamic is much needed. By
integrating demographic and socioeconomic factors into one forecast model, this
research examines the labor force development in urban China to the year 2020. The
research shows that in the following 20 years, China’s urban labor supply tends to grow
at a rate of 2% per year. The development of the labor force tends to be most sensitive
to the movement of three factors, namely, urbanization, expansion in higher education
and the establishment of a National Social Security System. Fertility and mortality
would only make a small impact on the future urban labor market. Urbanization is likely
to be the major factor responsible for increasing the number in the urban labor force.
The growth in higher education, which can delay the time that young people enter the
labor market, could function as a buffer to reduce the tension in the labor market and, at
the same time, improve labor quality. The forecast also shows that the income reform
and the forthcoming National Social Security System appear to be crucial to the female
labor supply dynamic. They make it possible to change the family labor division and
thus alter female labor force participation from the plateau pattern to the M-pattern.
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1Forecasting Labor Supply in Urban China:
Integrating Demographic Dynamics and
Socioeconomic Transition
Ya XU
China is the most populous country in the world and consequently has the largest stock
of labor force. This situation will be true at least until the first half of the next century.
As a result of the Economic System Reform, China’s urban labor market has been under
growing pressure. One of the causes of the pressure comes from the huge inflow of rural
surplus labor into cities following the relaxation of restrictions on rural-to-urban
migration in 1984. Another cause is from the massive lay-offs from the State-owned
enterprises. Studies have shown limited job supply versus growing demand (see, among
others, Mo 1999; Yang 1997). According to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,
in 1999 China would have to create 23.8 million jobs in the cities to meet the demands
of all the urban job seekers. However, estimates indicate that it may only be able to
create as few as 5.5 million urban jobs (cited from Lawrence 1999), suggesting that
more than four people will compete for one position. Some may doubt the accuracy of
these estimations; it is hard, however, to deny the reality that China has to enter the
twenty-first century with an over-crowded urban labor market.
Given the fact that for more than three decades during the Centrally Planned System,
people in urban areas have been accustomed to having jobs guaranteed by the
government, the crisis in the labor market might possibly cause social unrest. Therefore,
the Chinese authorities view urban employment not only as an economic issue, but also
as a political challenge.
Against this background, since 1990s, employment has gained an increasingly
important position in China’s policy making. For example, the target of economic
growth rate for 1998 was based mainly on the consideration of assimilation of
unemployment (Yang 1997:9-25).
As a precondition to balance labor supply and labor demand in the future, a set of
reliable information both in economic development and in labor force is indispensable,
in which a high quality labor forecast is the cornerstone. However, although the forecast
on population has long been successful in China, a satisfied prediction on labor supply
has hardly been seen. The problem lies in the fact that the labor supply involves not
only demographic variables, but also socioeconomic variables, and the integration of
both variables into one forecast model has been thought difficult.
As a pitiful result, some forecasts with the purpose of estimating labor supply could
tell no more than the volume of the working age population (see Yang 1997:314), which
is merely the potential labor force. For this reason, although there have been many
population forecasts for China made either inside the country or abroad, and they all
2show the great similarities in telling the number of the total population as well as the
number of the working age population in future years, the question of how many people
will be active in the labor market is still a number for speculation. The significant
development in population modeling in recent years allows us to add other dimensions
to the standard age and sex structure of population projection (see, among others,
Goujon and Wils 1996; Lutz et al. 1999; Lutz and Scherbov 1989; Yousif et al. 1996;
UN 1998; Zeng et al. 1999). That makes it possible for a population forecast to go down
to the labor force stratum. The challenge left is how to make reliable scenarios. In
comparison to demographic events, socioeconomic activities are more difficult to
foresee because of their complicated causal structure and varied transition modes. This
means that the success of a labor forecast depends not only on the sophistication of
model technology but also on the discernment of the social, demographic as well as
natural systems within which the labor force develops.
Furthermore, from the point of problem solving, China needs more than a labor
forecast that tells how much labor force will be in the future labor market. The causal
structure of labor dynamic, by which people are able to perceive how the labor supply
will change if some socioeconomic policy is adjusted, is equally desired. For instance,
at moment, China is undertaking a reform on the higher education system as well as
establishing a National Social Security System in urban areas. Will these events
influence the future labor market and, if so, how significantly?
By employing the multi-state PDE (population-development-environment)
population projection model, which was developed by the IIASA Population Project
(see Lutz 1994), this research attempts to integrate all the major influential factors into
one projection model and provide a labor forecast for urban China to 2020. Besides the
main forecasts grounded on the reality-based assumptions, we also make dummy
forecasts according to dummy scenarios. By comparing these two kinds of forecasts, we
hope to understand the causal structure of the labor dynamic.
The results show that in the 20 years to come, China’s urban labor supply is expected
to grow at the rate of about 2% per year, reaching some 330 million in 2020 compared
to 202 million in 1995. The development of the labor force tends to be most sensitive to
the movement of three factors, namely, urbanization, expansion in higher education and
the establishment of a National Social Security System. Fertility and mortality would
only have a small impact on the future urban labor market. Urbanization is likely to be
the major factor responsible for increasing the number in the urban labor force. The
expansion in higher education, which can delay the time that young people enter the
labor market, could function as a buffer to reduce the tension in the labor market and, at
the same time, improve labor quality. The forecast also shows that the income reform
and the forthcoming National Social Security System appear to be crucial to the female
labor supply dynamic. They make it possible to change the family labor division and
thus alter female labor force participation from the plateau pattern to the M-pattern.
This paper is organized into four sections. In the first section we clarify the
components of influential factors that lay behind the change of labor supply. Based on
that, an analytical framework is established. In the second section, the feasible
movements for each of the influential factors in urban China in the concerned period are
discussed, and consequently the scenarios for both main forecasts and dummy forecasts
are set out. Next, we will introduce the methodology applied and the model employed as
3well as the data used. Finally, we present our prediction results and conclude with
discussion.
Influential Factors and Analytical Framework
Population, Working Age Population, and Labor Force
If we assume a zero migration, a region’s working age population is the trunk of the
total population who is in the age span eligible to be in the labor market. In urban
China, the working age population is set as follows: the age to enter the labor market is
15 for both men and women, whereas the retirement age is sex- and occupation-
dependant. Most of the men retire at age 60 and women at age 55. For physical labor,
women retire earlier, at age 50. But for senior professional staff, women retire at 60, the
same age as men (Zhang and Liu 1996:77-78).
Not all working age population is considered as labor force. Only those who are
economically active, i.e., either employed or actively seeking employment, are
identified as labor force (Figure 1). Those who are not intending to, or not able to, offer
their labor for wage or profit are economically inactive and are assumed to have no
direct impact on the job market. The causes for their economic inactivity are various.
Being engaged in education, occupied by family duty, dissatisfied with the salary or
poor health can all keep them outside the competition in the labor market.
In an environment that is open to migration, the labor supply is also influenced by
the size, structure as well as economic activity of the migrant population.
Figure 1. Concept of the labor force.
Total population
Working age population
(usually aged 15-60)    
Non working age population
(usually people younger than 15 and older
than 60)
Labor force
•employed
•unemployed
Non-labor force
•student
•housekeeper
•...
If working age
If economically active
4Demographic and Socioeconomic Factors
The dynamic of the labor force is a covariate of demographic behavior and
socioeconomic behavior. As demographic behavior, its size, age- and sex- composition
is shaped by demographic factors, whereas as socioeconomic behavior, it varies and
fluctuates according to socioeconomic factors, which determine who is economically
active or inactive in the labor market.
To predict the labor supply, we inescapably need to consider both factors. In order to
get labor force, we must put the population through two sieves. The first is a
demographic sieve made by the wire of fertility, mortality and migration, through which
the working age population is sifted out. Then the working age population has to be put
through the second sieve, the socioeconomic sieve, through which the labor force is
identified (Figure 2). When comparing the composition of demographic factors, which
are composed of fertility, mortality, and (sometimes) migration, the family of
socioeconomic factors seems to consist of too many members, which may make the
archetype too complicated. Moreover, the dynamics of demographic events, due to the
nature of population inertia, are comparatively foreseeable1 and thus easier to be
modeled, while the effect of some socioeconomic factors on labor force participation
seem to be unpredictable. The change in wage rates, the new regulation on working
hours, can and sometimes is used purposely to change the labor supply in a short time.
We think that these different attributes between demographic factors and socioeconomic
factors are part of the main reasons why so few socioeconomic factors are introduced
into population projection models. Nonetheless, after careful examination and with
sufficient understanding of the socioeconomic context in which the population lives, we
can grasp and model the key factors that determine the trend of labor mobility.
Two events are among the most powerful factors determining the economic activity
of the working age population. The first is education, which determines the economic
activity of young people. The second is the engagement in housework, which forms the
strongest motivation for people in the middle age as well as in old age to withdraw from
the labor market.
With the examinations above, we identify three demographic variables (fertility,
mortality and net migration) and two socioeconomic variables (years spent in education
and years engaged in housework) as the basic influential factors for our labor force
forecast. Fertility, mortality and migration influence labor supply by shaping the
working age population, while education and engaging in housework impact labor
supply by directly controlling people’s motivation to be active in the labor market. In
the next section we will discuss the present situation as well as possible development for
each of these influential factors in urban China.
                                               
1
 As Lutz and Prinz (1994) put it, the effects of changes in fertility, mortality, and migration on
population characteristics are not always immediate, but they follow the laws of population dynamic.
That is why even a severe famine or certain epidemics do not directly diminish total population size but
work through age- and sex-specific death rates that are applied to the given population structure. For the
same reason, the population growth rate will not go down immediately when a rapid decline in fertility is
applied to a very young structure of the population. It may take many years until it results in significantly
declining growth rates (pp. 221-222).
5Figure 2. Population forms its labor force through two sieves.
Assumption Setting and Scenario Design
Influential Factors and their Prospective Changes: Assumption Setting
Fertility
Starting in the late 1970s, China’s government has set up a well-structured
administration system to reduce the fertility rate. Under the “one-child” policy that has
been effectively implemented in the cities, the urban Total Fertility Rate (TFR) has been
below replacement level for two decades, even though the desired number of children
per couple has been stable around 2. In 1995, TFR for urban (city and town) areas was
1.19 (calculated from Office of National Population Sample Survey 1997).
As the new century approaches, discussions about future fertility policies have
appeared mostly within the academic circles (see Liang et al. 1998). In consideration of
the fast aging of the population, many scholars have suggested a slight rise in the
Total population
Demographic sieve:
(clarify size, age- and sex-
composition of population)
• fertility
• mortality
• migration
Result:
Working age population
Socioeconomic sieve:
(clarify who is
economically active)
• school enrolment
• labor force participation
 pattern
Result:
Labor force
6fertility level for China. Yang Shu-Zhang, a scholar from the Centre of China’s
Population Information and Research, proposes a policy of “gradually reducing the
control of fertility, and then keeping on a moderate level” for the next century (Yang
1998:31-32). Zeng Yi (1998) favors an urban TFR of 1.7 to balance the needs of
supporting an aging population and a mild population growth rate.
Despite these discussions, however, according to Zhang Wei-qing, Minister of the
Family Planning Commission of China, China’s family planning programs will be
maintained for the foreseeable future (China Daily, March 15, 1999). Premier Zhu
Rong-ji expressed the same idea in his letter written for the “World 6 Billion Population
Day” (Zhu Rong-ji 1999). This decision is based on the fact that, in spite of a low
fertility rate, the large population still brings 21 million births every year and an annual
net increase of 13 million (State Family Planning Commission 1999a). It is projected
that in dozens of years to come, an extra 300 million people will be added to China’s
heavy population load before its population becomes stable (China Daily, March 15,
1999). The situation of low fertility but high growth, coupled with the pressure from
shortages of water, arable land, job opportunities, etc., makes the government hesitant to
relax its fertility control.
Given the effectiveness of government administration, we assume that the change of
fertility over the next twenty years will be mainly within the boundary drawn by the
policy. However, it would be a mistake to think that following the fertility policy means
“one child per couple” forever. The one-child policy has been designed for one
generation only (China Daily, June 16, 1999). That means that if two people who were
single children get married, they would be allowed to have two children.2 Given that
most of the children born after the one-child policy in the cities are single children, and
that they shall enter parenthood in the first two decades of the next century, the urban
TFR will inevitably increase because of this policy.
Therefore, along with the marriage among single children and the start of their
parenthood, we assume that the urban TFR will gradually increase from the level of
1.19 in 1995. If all couples have two children by the year 2020, TFR will be 2. Yet
considering that some couples may not be single children and some may voluntarily
have only one child, the TFR may be around 1.5 in 2020. Therefore, we give three
assumptions on future TFR:
Assumptions            TFR in 2020
Conservative
Moderate
Radical
                 1.5
                 1.75
                 2.0
Mortality
The mortality rate in China declined quickly after the establishment of the People’s
Republic of China in 1949. In 1980, the life expectancy at birth in China reached 66.4
for men and 69.4 for women. After that, however, the speed of increase in life
                                               
2
 “Two children for a couple made up of two single children” has been the policy since the beginning of
the Family Planning Program in China. It was reconfirmed at the beginning of 2000 (see China News
Digest, February 4, 2000).
7expectancy has slowed down. In 1995 the life expectancy in China was 68 and 71 for
men and women, respectively (Office of National Population Sample Survey 1997). In
1998 the figures only increased to 68.2 for men and 71.7 for women (UNFPA 1998).3
Based on the past pattern of development, we assume a limited progress in life
expectancy from the above mentioned levels and the assumptions set for the year 2020
are as below:
Assumptions Life expectancy at birth, 2020
Men Women
Conservative 69 72
Moderate 70 73
Radical 71 74
Migration
China has been a dual society with an overt socioeconomic line drawn between urban
and rural people. Urban residents and farmers hold different Hu-kou or, booklet of
resident registration, and urban Hu-kou links to privileges in employment, receiving
government subsidies, and so on. Therefore, the direction of migration in China is
mainly from rural to urban. The reverse is very rare. Before the Economic System
Reform, change of rural Hu-kou into urban was extremely difficult. Without urban Hu-
kou, a farmer was principally not allowed to work or stay long in the city. With such a
strict control, migration from rural to urban was very limited. Consequently, till now,
China’s urban population only accounts for 30% of the total, which has accumulated
large numbers of surplus labor force in the countryside. Official prediction indicates that
the country’s surplus labor force currently stands at more than 100 million people, and
will surpass 200 million in 2000 (China Daily, June 16, 1998).
After the Economic System Reform, particularly after 1984, China started an ever-
faster process of urbanization, which has taken two paths. The first is “guided
urbanization,” which recruits rural labor force in urban jobs and expands and rebuilds
rural towns into small cities according to the government plan. Rural people who have
followed this path into the cities are supposed to change their rural Hu-Kou into the
urban one, and have been classified as urban dwellers in the official statistics.
According to the statistics, from 1980 to the end of 1997, the number of cities has
grown from 223 to 668, the number of towns from 2,874 to 17,900 and the urban
population has grown from 191 million to 379 million (State Family Planning
Commission 1999b; China Daily, March 15, 1999). Yet more farmers have entered the
cities by another way, “spontaneous urbanization,” if we may call it. Following the new
policy by which farmers are allowed to look for jobs and work in the cities, millions of
rural people have poured themselves into the urban areas, seeking chances to earn
money. They still hold their rural Hu-kou, and their number is rather uncertain,
fluctuating according to the urban labor market, farm-work intensity, and many other
social, personal factors. For example, when there are opportunities in the urban job
market, they come. And when the job is done, they leave. When there is not much work
                                               
3
 Yang Kuifu (in China Daily, March 15, 1999) estimated that China’s life expectancy in 1998 was 68.8
for men and 73.2 for women. Here we take the UNFPA estimate.
8in the crop fields, they go to the cities, and when the field demands intensive labor, they
go back again. They become the main body of a city’s “floating population.” According
to incomplete statistics, there is a floating population of 80 million, with 60% to 70% of
them from the countryside (State Family Planning Commission 1999b; China Daily,
March 15, 1999).
The new immigrants assure labor supply for the jobs that urban people usually do not
want to take, and have contributed to a significant part in urban development. On the
other side, however, the huge inflow of “floating population” causes tensions such as
crowded public transportation, shortage of energy supply and housing, etc.
Despite the problems, economists claim a theorem that a 1% rise in the urban
population will pull the gross domestic product up by 1.5% (China Daily, January 20,
1999). In view of a positive relationship between urbanization and domestic
consumption growth, the government sees urbanization as the best way to expand the
domestic market and to solve rural surplus labor force, and thus has decided to give
urbanization a high priority in its 10th Five-Year Plan (2001-2005).
Since speeding up the urbanization is the preference of both farmers and the
government, we can safely assume an increase in the numbers of net urban immigrants.
When we set the numbers of net migration for urban areas in the future, we shall only
consider the immigrants by the first way, i.e., by the way of “guided urbanization.”
During the 9th Five-Year Plan period (1996-2000), 45.9 million rural people have
turned into city residents (China Daily, June 16, 1998). The government plans to speed
up the process by raising the growth rate of rural migration by one percent each year
over the next 15 years (China News Digest, October 20, 1999; Yong zi 1998). Such an
expansion will allow 85 million of the rural population to shift from rural to urban
within the next five years (Zhao 1999), while academics predict an even faster process.
According to Tian, a demographer from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,
China’s urban population will increase by 4% annually between 2001 and 2010, and by
3% between 2011 and 2025 (China Daily, June 20, 1998). Against this background, we
set out three assumptions on urban net migration:
Year Assumptions on net urban immigration (million people)
Conservative                       Moderate                  Radical
1996-2000
2001-2005
2006-2010
2011-2015
2016-2020
     45.90*                               45.90*                    45.90*
     47.29                                 49.51                      51.72
     49.70                                 56.31                      62.92
     52.24                                 63.28                      74.32
     54.90                                 70.53                      86.15
* Figure cited from the report “Rapid Growth Poses Hurdles” in China Daily (June 1, 1998), along with
the marriage among the single children and the start of their parenthood.
9Higher education
Education is highly respected in the Chinese tradition. In Confucianism, a sound
educational record is a prerequisite to becoming a qualified official (Xue Er You Ze Shi).
However, during the “Cultural Revolution” (1966-1976), education was badly damaged.
Teachers, particularly the university teachers, were at the bottom of the social scale on
the basis of the maxim: “the more knowledge you have, the more counter-revolutionary
you are.” No parents at that time wished their children to be “Intellectuals.” Workers in
state-owned factories and soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army were the best future
for young people. Higher education almost ground to a halt.
An active healing process on education started after 1978, the year when the
Economic System Reform began. At present, the education profile is a 6+3+3+4 model.
After six years of primary education, there is secondary education, which provides a
three-year junior secondary education and a three-year senior secondary education, in
comprehensive middle schools. Colleges and universities offer higher and postgraduate
education. It usually takes at least four years to get a bachelor’s degree. Besides formal
education, there is also a system offering vocational education, adult education,
television, and correspondence courses. The education law stipulates a nine-year
compulsory education: six years in primary school and three years in junior secondary
education. Almost all the educational institutions are funded and run by the state. From
1982 to 1997, the average length of education of Chinese people increased from 4.2
years to 5.8 years (Tian Xue-yuan in People’s Daily, September 11, 1999). By now,
primary and junior secondary education has been popularized in urban areas. But the
healing of higher education is far from complete. In 1995, only 5% of urban youth aged
20-24 received higher education, i.e., education offered in college and universities or
equivalent institutions (Office of National Population Sample Survey 1997).
Nonetheless, we can expect an acceleration in the development of higher education
in China judging from its huge demand and good financial prospects. First of all,
expanding higher education is the request of parents and students. The tradition has
returned along with the end of the “Cultural Revolution.” Nowadays a diploma not only
means prestigious social status but also brings bigger chances in the labor market.
According to All China Women’s Federation and National Statistical Bureau (1993),
about 49% of urban mothers and 30% of rural mothers expect their children to receive
higher education, which means obtaining a diploma from a college or university. The
survey conducted by MasterCard revealed that 71% of families in Beijing, Shanghai,
and Guang zhou save for their children’s education (China Youth Daily, October 15,
1999).
Yet higher education is not only a family or a young person’s concern. It is of
interest to the whole nation. Not only does economic development need a high quality
in the labor force; university is also seen as one of the powerful engines driving
domestic investment. According to an economist’s estimate, total educational spending
by China’s urban residents reached 90 billion yuan (US$ 10.8 billion) in 1997, far
exceeding the spending on housing (Hu 1999). A sample survey by the State Statistics
Bureau and the China Economic Prediction Centre, showed that total domestic savings
had exceeded 5,000 billion yuan (US$ 602.4 billion) so far, and 10% of these savings
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would be used for educational purposes.4 Hu (1999) calculates that, if half of the
savings meant for education were invested in schooling, this investment would be 250
billion yuan (US$ 30 billion), equal to the country’s total education budget. Therefore,
economists are calling for an industrialization and marketization of higher education so
as to not only meet the demand of parents and students, but also to enlarge educational
consumption to help propel sustained economic growth.5 In the eyes of Premier Zhu
Rongji, accelerating development of education has yet another function and that is to
help the country to ease the employment burden (Zhu Rongji, speech at the National
Education Working Conference, June 1999, cited from China Daily, June 21, 1999).
Due to all these demands and importance, the central government has decided to
raise the ratio of educational expenditure in the annual fiscal budget by 1 percentage
point each year from 1998 to 2002. Provincial governments have been asked to increase
their funding in accordance with their financial situations (China Daily, June 17, 1999).
Nevertheless, this would not be the only way to fuel the growth in education. Marketing
is believed to be another source. In the summer of 1999, Peking University got a loan
from the Huaxia bank, opening a new era of non-governmental organization
involvement in educational investment.
In fact, university admission has risen. In 1998, colleges and universities broke the
record of 1 million enrolments. In 1999, China’s higher education opened their doors to
1.5 million, a 42% increase in the number of new students in only one year (Man 1999).
Therefore, in spite of a comparatively low capacity of higher education in China at
the moment, we have concrete reasons to predict a rapid increase in enrolments in
colleges and universities in the future. In 1995, the probability for young urban people
to remain students or to enter the labor market were:
Observations*
Age Men Women
Probability of entering higher level of education
15-19 0.65 0.60
20-24 0.05 0.03
25-29 0.05 0.003
Probability of entering labor market
15-19 0.35 0.40
20-24 0.95 0.95
35-29 0.97 0.997
* Calculation from Office of National Population Sample Survey (1997).
                                               
4
 Other sources give an even higher percentage of educational saving, for example, Tian Xue-yuan
estimated that one-third of the household saving is for children’s education (China Daily, September 11,
1999), and Yang Kuifu believes the percentage is about 44% (China Daily, June 21, 1999).
5
 But, in front of the calls for educational industrialisation and marketization, the State Education
Committee (SEC) keeps a rational attitude. Insisting on the public nature of education, officials from SEC
commented that it is unrealistic to treat higher education as a highly profitable industry in the long run
(Man 1999).
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With a slight gender gap6 we assume the probabilities in the year 2020 for the same
age groups:
Age
                                    Assumptions for year 2020
        Conservative                    Moderate                       Radical
     men         women             men       women             men       women
Probability entering
higher level education
         15-19
         20-24
         25-29
Probability entering
labor market
         15-19
         20-24
         25-29
     0.85          0.8                   0.9          0.85               0.985        0.93
     0.175        0.155               0.24        0.22               0.30          0.28
     0.015        0.013               0.13        0.12               0.25          0.23
    0.15           0.15                 0.14         0.14             0.125         0.125
    0.825         0.845               0.71         0.72             0.60           0.60
    0.95           0.987               0.85         0.87             0.75           0.75
Engagement in housework
No other reasons can be stronger than family duty, particularly childcare, in pulling a
female employee away from her job, which creates a worldwide gender difference in the
patterns of age-specific employment rate. Except for the school years, men in almost
every country show a consistently high labor force participation in all working ages. Labor
force participation rates typically show an inverted “U”-shaped plateau pattern.
Women’s working career line, on the other hand, is characterized by the cut of “child-
trough(s)” and thus forms a pattern of peaks. According to the time of childbearing and
the number of children, the peaks can be further distinguished into early peak, later
peak and double peak (or M-pattern). The early peak is a type where the female labor
force mainly consists of single or young married women and where participation occurs
dominantly before childbearing, dropping off steadily during and after it. The later peak is
a type where women enter the labor force mainly after childbearing is completed, some
perhaps forced into the work force by widowhood. The M-pattern is followed by labor
force dropping during childbearing but then rising again after it (see Platenga 1995;
Stichter and Parpart 1990).
Chinese urban women have kept a male-styled plateau pattern for four decades.
Three main reasons have contributed to this. First, they go to work because the paid
work can bring them a better status in society and in the family. After a long
emancipation campaign and long labor force participation, many women in China have
                                               
6
 According to the survey conducted by the Institute of Population Studies of the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences (1994), 64% of urban people thought that boys should receive higher education, while the
percentage for girls was 45%. Although the expectation for girls was some 19 percentage points lower
than for boys, it was already unprecedentedly high in a tradition that does not consider intelligence an
appreciated character for women. In spite of some male-centered legacy apparent in public opinion, we
anticipate a narrowing down of the gender gap receiving higher education in the future. The “only child”
situation gives parents no room to make gender differences in educational investment. Looking at the
urban family, we find that parents of a single girl invest no less than those of single boys. Quite
commonly, given the existence of gender discrimination in the job market and in other aspects of social
life in China, single girls’ parents tend to invest more in education for their daughters so as to make them
more competitive in the society.
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seen the engagement in paid work as part of their life. Second, women go to work
because of the economic necessity. The salary system of the Centrally Planned
Economy, which was low and equal among the employees, made the family income
depend more on the number of people employed than on the quality of labor the
household offered. Consequently, the family with one bread-earner found that their total
income was just about half of their colleagues and neighbors, which was not only
economically degrading, but also socially embarrassing. Thus the double-income was
basic for a family to keep the urban standard of living. After the Economic System
Reform, the income disparity has been enlarged. Some get higher salaries from their
successful performance in the market, yet many more remain in state-owned enterprises
and continue the legacy of the old salary system, or work in low-paid jobs in the market
sector. As a result, many families still need double income to hold up their economic
status and to deal with the allure of the growing consumption market. Third, women go
to work to reduce uncertainty and to maximize family utility during the economic
transition. As China continues on its way to a market system, the characteristics of jobs
are converting from “low-paid yet with a life-long contract” to “paid according to the
effort, with no long contract.” During the period of transition, both types of jobs will co-
exist until the transition process is completed. Given the fact that China lacks a national
system that provides insurance for unemployment and for employees in both state and
market sectors, from the family benefit point of view, each type has its short-comings
and merits. The salary in the state sector is known to be low; the market salary is
generally higher. But the state sector provides better benefits like health insurance,
housing, pension, etc. For example, if one loses a job in the market, he/she would have
nothing to rely on but savings. When a state-owned factory faces bankruptcy, arranging
new jobs for the workers has always been at the top of the authority’s agenda (see series
of reports on laid-off state workers since 1997 in People’s Daily and China Daily). It is
natural for a family to want to use the division of labor to obtain the merits from both
types of jobs. The gap between the two sectors is narrowing each day -- a result of
reform on the state sector and improvement in working conditions on the market sector.
Before the transition is done, each will hold some advantage over the other.
Consequently, a division of family labor between the two sectors will remain as a way
to maximize household utility for many families. All these reasons leave Chinese urban
women little chance to be full housewives.
Although women’s employment is necessary and women in urban China have
engaged in a plateau pattern for long time, this does not mean that everyone is happy
with it all the time. When housework is not shared by both spouses, which is still the
case in many urban families, and when the children are young, many working mothers
are suffering from the stress of a double burden.
Two national surveys on women have revealed that without economic necessity,
about 20% of the women would have withdrawn from their jobs voluntarily (All China
Women’s Federation and National Statistical Bureau 1993; Institute of Population
Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 1994).
Conditions that enable people to choose to leave employment (perhaps only for a
special period) are on the horizon. First, along with marketization, payment is more and
more dependent upon capability, which makes the quality, rather than quantity, of
family labor decisive in family income. Families that are supported by a single high
income are on the rise. Second, in 1999, the government began to establish a National
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Social Security System (NSSS), including the guarantee of a minimum standard of
living,7 a pension system, unemployment and health insurance, which are to cover all
urban employees both in the state and market sectors.8 The success of this new policy
will reduce the economic risk borne by the people who do not work and by those who
work in the market sector. This may bring little change in men’s labor force
participation, but it will certainly enlarge the chances for women to concentrate on the
family, particularly those women with heavy family duty but who have to work for the
family’s financial as well as security needs. The following causal relation is likely to
happen:
In this wave,
We, therefore, assume a change in the plateau pattern of the female labor force
participation in the future.
Who would like to leave the labor market for family duty? We expect that working
mothers with young children will be most likely to fall into this group. Considering that
Chinese urban women have fewer children and women’s employment has been widely
accepted by the society, we anticipate that women without financial pressure will have a
high probability of leaving the labor market when they begin motherhood, and will re-
join the labor force when their children reach a certain age, presumably school age.
We define a population’s labor force participation as an M-pattern when the line is
shaped like the letter M and the difference between the “gorge” and the highest “peak”
is larger than 15 percentage points. This means a change in female labor force
participation from the present plateau pattern to the M-pattern in urban China. The age
group of the highest fertility rate, i.e. 25-29, will fall into the “gorge.” Three
assumptions on the pattern of urban women’s labor force participation are made based
on the different expectations of the pace of the transition from plateau pattern to M-
pattern.
Assumptions Urban women’s labor force participation pattern
Conservative
Moderate
Radical
keep present plateau pattern till 2020
change to M-pattern since 2010
change to M-pattern since 2005
                                               
7
 See Decree No. 271, the State Council of People’s Republic of China, Regulations on Minimum Living
Standard Guarantee for Urban Residents, issued by Premier Zhu Rong-ji on 28 September 1999.
8
 See Decree No. 259, the State Council of People’s Republic of China, Provisional Regulations on the
Social Security Payment, issued by Premier Zhu Rong-ji on 22 January 1999.
Establishing
of NSSS
Change in family labor
division:
Double income is less
necessary
Increase in
individual
salary
Change in female labor
force participation:
Some women will leave
labor market when
children are young
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Scenario Design
Based on assumptions on the influential factors, we give three scenarios for our main
labor forecast (Table 1):
Table 1. Three scenarios for urban labor force forecasts, 1995-2020.
Conservative Scenario Moderate Scenario Radical Scenario
Demographic factors
Total Fertility Rate (TFR)
Life expectancy at birth (in year)
                       Male
                    Female
Urbanization
(number of net urban migration)
(million people in 5 years)
                   1996 – 2000
                   2001 – 2005
                   2006 – 2010
                   2011 – 2015
                   2016 – 2020
Socioeconomic factors
Education
Probability to enter higher level
education
               Age: 15-19
                        20-24
                        25-29
Probability for students to enter
the labor force
                Age: 15-19
                        20-24
                        25-29
Women’s labor force
participation
1.50
69.0
72.0
(with an increase rate
of 1% per year)
45.90
47.29
49.70
52.24
54.90
men        women
0.85         0.8
0.175       0.155
0.015       0.013
men        women
0.15         0.15
0.825       0.845
0.95         0.987
remain at present
level of labor supply
during 1995-2020
1.75
70.0
73.0
(with increase
rates of 2.5% b/t
2001-2010 and 2%
b/t 2011-2020)
45.90
49.51
56.31
63.28
70.53
men        women
0.9           0.85
0.24         0.22
0.13         0.12
men        women
0.14         0.14
0.71         0.72
0.85         0.87
change the plateau
pattern into M-
pattern since 2010
2.00
71.0 (2020)
74.0 (2020)
(with increase
rates of 4% b/t
2001-2010 and 3%
b/t 2011-2020)
45.90
51.72
62.92
74.32
86.15
men       women
0.985       0.93
0.21         0.18
0.03         0.028
men        women
0.125       0.125
0.60         0.60
0.75         0.75
change the plateau
pattern into M-
pattern since 2005
Conservative Scenario. Combining all the conservative assumptions on development
of influential factors, this scenario assumes that all the events will change at a slow
pace. For fertility, it assumes that by 2020, each woman will have 1.5 children; life
expectancy for both men and women only increases less than 2 years from the level of
1998; number of urban immigrants will only grow at the rate of 1% per year throughout
2000-2020. The development of higher education (represented by the probability that a
student will remain a student over the next five years, and the probability that a student
will enter the labor market within the next five years) is also going to proceed in a
comparatively gradual manner. Female labor force participation will stay at the 1995
level for the projection period, and thus will remain a plateau pattern.
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Moderate Scenario. This scenario blends all the moderate assumptions and takes the
middle way between the conservative and the radical scenarios in estimating the
changes in fertility, mortality, migration and higher education. For women’s labor force
participation, it assumes a gradual reduction in labor supply of women during child-
bearing ages, thus the age-specific rate of female labor force participation will change
into an M-pattern as of 2010.
Radical Scenario. All radical assumptions are joined together. It represents the
estimation that all influential factors will change at a fast rate. According to this
scenario, TFR in 2020 will be 2 for urban women and life expectancy will be about 3
years longer than in 1998. The number of urban immigrants will grow at a rate of 4%
during 2000-2010 and 3% during 2011-2020. The increase in chances for people aged
15-29 in higher education will increase at a swift speed. Women in childbearing ages
will reduce their labor supply overtly and thus the pattern of female labor force
participation will present an M-pattern as early as 2005.
In order to observe the interactions among the influential factors during labor force
development, and to analyze the causes of increases/decreases in labor supply, we make
a set of dummy forecasts that include one “zero-change” forecast and five “partial-
change” forecasts. The zero-change forecast assumes that all events will continue in the
pace and pattern of 1995 until 2020. It gives an outline of the labor supply if there were
no changes in transitions in all the influential factors.
The partial-change forecasts are made to observe the impact of each individual factor
on future labor supply. In every partial-change forecast, one factor develops on the basis
of the moderate scenario, while others are held at the 1995 level. For example, the
partial-change forecast for fertility is made on the assumption that TFR will increase
from 1.19 in 1995 to 1.75 in 2020 (moderate assumption), whereas the life expectancy,
migration scale, higher education participation as well as female labor force
participation patterns all continue as in 1995.
In sum, in estimating the labor supply in urban China and in analyzing its causal
structure, we need to make the following forecasts:
Type of forecast Number of forecast Scenario basis
Main forecasts:
   Conservative
   Moderate
   Radical
Dummy forecasts:
   “zero-change”
   “partial-change”
1
1
1
1
5
Conservative
Moderate
Radical
All influential factors keep the level of
1995
One of the influential factors develops
according to the moderate assumption
while the rest keep the level of 1995
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Model and Data
Multi-State Population Projection and the PDE Model
Multi-state population projections (Rogers 1975; Keyfitz 1980; Land and Rogers 1982)
have been employed in making the forecasts. This methodology has been developed
into computer software named PDE (Population-Development-Environment) by the
Population Project at IIASA. Compared to the traditional demographic event-based
projection model, PDE enables us to integrate demographic and socioeconomic factors
into population projection. Thus, we can see not only the change in the size of the
population caused by demographic factors, but also the changes between labor and non-
labor states of a population. Lutz (1994) gives a detailed introduction to the PDE model.
Data Required and 1% Population Sample Survey
To predict the age and sex structure of a future population, we need to start with a base
population that is age and sex specific. To forecast the dynamics of labor supply
influenced by demographic factors and educational development as well as transition in
housework engagement, we must start with a base population that is not only age and
sex specific, but also decomposed into four states, namely, labor force, student,
housekeeper, and other non-labor. Only when the base population is recorded in such a
way are we able to observe the interactions among all those determinants. The
definitions of these four states are listed as follows:
1. Labor force (L): those who are of working age and are either employed or looking
for jobs.
2. Student (S): those who study full time in schools or universities.
3. Housekeeper (H): those who are fully engaged in family duties, such as taking care
of children and/or the elderly.
4. Other non-labor (O): those who are below the working age, or disabled, or retired.
Transitions between these four states (see Figure 3) have different meanings and
involve different groups of people. For example,
1. O→S means people who are neither labor force, nor housekeeper, nor entering
school to become a student. In the case of urban China, this event mainly concerns
children between the ages of 5-9.
2. S→S stands for students in certain age groups who will continue their education
when they enter the next age group. The expansion of higher education is reflected
by the higher probability of this transition among students aged 15-29.
3. S→L refers to students entering the labor market between the ages of 15 to 29.
4. L→H indicates people exiting the labor market and becoming housekeepers. This
transition concerns two groups of women: those who just start motherhood, and
those who leave the labor market and become housekeepers after retirement.
5. H→L means housekeepers entering the labor market, and mainly concerns women
who return to the labor market after their children reach a certain age.
6. L→O: mostly refers to people exiting the labor market due to retirement.
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Figure 3. Four states and their main transitions.
Changes in the proportion of labor force and non-labor force due to education and
labor force participation rates mean the changes in transition probabilities among the
related states. With the purpose of observing age- and sex-specific transitions among
these four states of China’s urban population over the period from 1995 to 2020, we use
the data from the National 1% Population Sample Survey (conducted at 0 hour, 1
October 1995) as the basis data (Office of National Population Sample Survey 1997).
This data provides us not only with age- and sex-specific records that accommodate
demographic analysis, but also gives detailed classification of socioeconomic states of
the population, which enables us to decompose the starting population into the four
states. Moreover, the 1% Sample Survey of 1995 is the latest demographic statistics
available at present.
Projection Results and Discussion
Projection Results
Total population and working age population
In 1995, the total urban population in China was 353 million. The projection shows that,
by 2020, the figure will double, with a minimum of 606 million (conservative scenario)
and a maximum of 701 million (radical scenario). The urban sex ratio (male/female)
will decrease slightly from 1.01 in 1995 to 0.99 in 2020 largely due to population aging
and higher mortality rates for the male population in older age-groups.
Labor force
(L)
Student
(S)
Other non-labor force
(O)
Housekeeper
(H)
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The annual growth rate is estimated between 2.2% and 2.8% by conservative
projections and radical projections, respectively. The growth of urban population will
result in an expansion in the source of labor force at a rate of 2% per year (conservative
scenario) or 2.6% per year (radical scenario). Till 2020, the number of working age
population in cities and towns will range between 384 million (conservative scenario) to
434 million (radical scenario) (Table 2), compared to 231 million in 1995. The sex ratio
of the working age population will rise from 1.07 in 1995 to around 1.14, as a result of
the influence of gender structure from the immigrant population which is expected to
consist of mainly working age population.
Table 2. Estimated working age population, urban China, 2000-2020. Three scenarios in
main forecasts, in million people.
Year Conservative Scenario Moderate Scenario Radical Scenario
total male female total male female total male female
1995* 232 120 112 232 120 112 232 120 112
2000 269 139 130 269 139 130 269 139 130
2005 311 162 149 311 162 149 313 163 150
2010 339 179 160 346 183 163 352 186 166
2015 364 193 171 378 200 178 391 207 184
2020 384 205 179 409 218 191 434 231 203
* data from Office of National Population Sample Survey 1997.
Labor force
In 1995, China’s urban labor force was 202 million. By 2020 the number should be
around 330 million, according to our projection, at an annual growth rate of 2%.
The conservative scenario shows a low population growth (low immigration level
and low fertility) but a high economic activity rate (due to early labor force participation
of young people and women) (Table 1). If the labor supply follows the conservative
scenario, the total labor force would be 343 million, the highest among the results of the
three scenarios. The radical scenario, on the other hand, shows a high population growth
(large immigration number and higher fertility level) but a low economic activity rate
(due to low labor supply of young people and women). It predicts a lower labor supply
of 332 million. The moderate scenario, with its moderate assumptions in population
growth as well as in economic activity rates, gives the lowest labor supply of 326
million.
From the gender perspective, we find that if the labor supply follows the
conservative scenario, there would be the lowest male labor supply (185 million) but the
highest female labor supply (158 million) among the three projections. On the contrary,
the radical scenario estimates the highest male labor supply (204 million) but the lowest
female labor supply (128 million). The moderate scenario provides values between the
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two for both of the genders, with 195 million male labor force and 130 female labor
force (Table 3).
Table 3. Comparison of labor force supply, urban China, 2000-2020. Three scenarios in
main forecasts, in million people.
Year Conservative Scenario Moderate Scenario Radical Scenario
total male female total male female total male female
1995* 202 111 91 202 111 91 202 111 91
2000 236 127 109 236 127 109 236 127 109
2005 271 145 126 266 145 121 259 145 114
2010 303 162 141 291 163 128 276 165 111
2015 326 175 151 312 179 130 302 184 118
2020 343 185 158 326 195 131 332 204 128
* data from Office of National Population Sample Survey 1997.
Labor force structure
Different scenarios present us with different structures of the future labor force. In the
assumption of an increase in higher education and a decrease in mothers’ labor force
participation, the proportion of labor force among people aged 15-35 shows a trend of
decline in the following 20 years. As shown in Figure 4, the proportions of labor force
among people aged 15-35 drop from 83.17% in 1995 to 78.7% in the conservative
scenario, 70.1% in the moderate scenario, and 67% in the radical scenario in 2020.
Accordingly, we can expect a future labor force in urban China that is older in mean age
yet better educated.
Figure 4. Proportion of labor force among people aged 15-35 (three scenarios in main
forecasts).
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A change in the sex composition of the labor force is also anticipated. As can be seen
in Figure 5, the sex ratios of the labor force show a small decrease in all three scenarios
from 1.23 in 1995 to 1.17 in 2000. Afterwards, the ratio holds steadily in the
conservative scenario from 2005 to 2015, and finally ends at the same level of 1.17 in
2020, a result of the assumption of the constant plateau pattern in female labor force
participation. With the assumption of a transition in female labor force participation
from plateau pattern to M-pattern, however, both the radical scenario and the moderate
scenario indicate a possible decline in the share of female labor force. In the radical
scenario, the sex ratio of the labor force jumps from 1.17 in 2000 to 1.48 in 2010. From
2010, the increase in sex ratio slows down and ends at 1.6 in 2020. The moderate
scenario exhibits a steady increase in sex ratio from 1.17 in 2000 to 1.49 in 2020.
1,0
1,2
1,4
1,6
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2000
year
%
conservative
moderate
radical
Figure 5. Labor force sex ratio (male/female) (three scenarios in main forecasts).
In terms of age-specific labor force participation, the projection indicates a stable
pattern in male careers in the labor market and a dramatic variation for females.
Although there is a minor postponement in time of entering the labor market due to the
increase in participation in higher education, men are not expected to change the plateau
pattern during the period 2000 to 2020 regardless of the scenario (Figure 6).
Female labor force participation, on the other hand, shows a different picture as of
the year 2000 (Figure 7). As outlined in the main forecasts, in 2000, the plateau pattern
dominates the three forecasts. As of 2010, the conservative scenario predicts an
unchanged plateau pattern for female labor force participation, while the radical forecast
gives a clear M-pattern for the same year. The moderate scenario, standing between the
two, illustrates a transition from plateau pattern to M-pattern. By the year 2020, the
conservative scenario still remains with the plateau pattern, whereas the radical scenario
points to a further deep M-pattern and the moderate scenario steers closer to the radical
scenarios.
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Figure 6. Male age-specific labor force participation rates in years 2000, 2010 and 2020
(three scenarios in main forecasts).
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Figure 7. Female age-specific labor force participation rates in years 2000, 2010 and
2020 (three scenarios in main forecasts).
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Causal structure of labor force dynamics
By running dummy projections, including one “zero-change” forecast and five “partial-
change” forecasts, we can see how labor supply and its structure are affected by
influential factors. First of all, dummy projections show that different influential factors
impact on the labor development in different directions. Comparing the forecast results
of the moderate scenario and the zero-change forecast, where all the influential factors
are kept unchanged at the 1995 level, the increase in fertility, the decrease in mortality,
and the increase in migration contribute to the augmentation of the number of labor
supply to 0.7 million, 1.3 million and 33.4 million, respectively. In total, the change of
these three factors from 1995 to 2020 would, in a moderate degree, add 35.4 million
laborers in 2020 (Table 4 and Figure 8). Thus, they are expected to play a positive role
in labor growth. Contrarily, expansion in higher education and an increase in
engagement in housework would reduce labor supply to 11.3 million and 36.4 million,
respectively. Their joint transitions in a moderate speed could cause a drop of 47.7
million in urban labor supply in 2020. Therefore, they are expected to play a negative
function in labor force increase. As a result of interaction between the positive and
negative factors, the total urban labor force in 2020 would be some 12.3 million less if
their transitions follow the pace set in the moderate scenario than that in the zero-change
forecast.
Table 4. Change in number of labor supply. Comparison of moderate, “zero-change”
and “partial-change” forecasts (in million people).
Type of scenario Compared to the zero-change forecast, the
labor supply in 2020 would be
total male female
If all determinants follow moderate scenario (MS) -12.3 13.1 -25.4
If other determinants remain at the 1995 level
Only TFR follows MS 0.7 0.3 0.4
Only life expectancy follows MS 1.3 1.0 0.3
Only migration follows MS 33.4 17.4 16.0
Only higher education follows MS -11.3 -5.6 -5.7
Only engagement in housework follows MS -36.4 0.0 -36.4
From a gender perspective, our forecast shows that the development of the male
labor force is free from the influence of some negative factors (i.e., change in labor
force participation pattern) but a bit more influenced by some positive factors (decrease
in mortality, increase in immigration) than the female counterpart. As the result, male
labor supply displays 13.1 million more in the moderate forecast than in the zero-change
forecast. Oppositely, female labor force is much more strongly influenced by some
negative factors (change in labor force participation pattern) and thus ends in 25.4
million less in 2020 in the moderate forecast than in the zero-change forecast.
Therefore, the total decline of 12.3 million laborers is the result of a 13.1 million
increase in male labor supply and 25.4 million decrease in female labor supply (Table 4
and Figure 8).
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Figure 8. Change of labor supply caused by each influential factor (partial-change
forecast).
Moreover, based on the partial-change forecasts, we find that each factor has a
different power of influence. In our forecast, the change in the labor force participation
pattern of women is the most powerful, and is responsible for 43.9% of the total change
in labor supply. Migration follows, causing 40.2% of the changes in labor. Next comes
higher education, with 13.6%. The increase in life expectancy and in fertility seems to
have a very small effect on the future urban labor market, with each less than 2% of the
labor dynamic (1.5% and 0.8% respectively) (Table 5).
Table 5. Percentage of changes in labor supply caused by each influential factor (one
factor develops, based on the moderate scenario, while the others remain at the 1995
level).
Influential factors Contributing percentage to the change of labor
supply, 1995-2020 (%)
total male female
TFR 0.8 1.1 0.6
Mortality 1.5 4.0 0.6
Migration 40.2 71.9 27.2
Higher education 13.6 23.0 9.6
Engagement in housework 43.9 0.0 62.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Yet each factor works differently on the different genders of the labor force. The
partial-change forecasts show that the male labor force is mostly impacted by the
change in migration (responsible for 71.9% of the male labor change) and education
(responsible for 23% of the male labor change). The rest of the factors play an
insignificant role (4% contribution from a decrease in mortality, 1.1% from an increase
in fertility and nearly zero from a change in labor force participation pattern). The
female labor force is mostly influenced by the change in labor participation patterns
(62% of the female labor dynamic). Migration (by contributing 27.2% of labor change)
is the second powerful determinant. Education comes in the third place, responsible for
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9.6% of female labor dynamic. The change in fertility and mortality only explain 1.2%
of the future female labor supply.
The comprehensive expression of the projection results is shown by the population
pyramids in the Appendix.
Discussion
About the increase in labor supply
Research shows that from 1995 to 2020, some 300 million people are expected to add
to urban China’s 350 million population. The proportion of urban population against
the total could be raised from 30% to nearly 50% in the same time span. Consequently,
the labor supply would grow at a rate of 2% per year, pulling the number of labor force
from 202 million in 1995 up to between 326 million to 343 million in 2020 (Table 3).
This means that on the one hand, China will continue to have abundant manpower to
support any robust economic growth in the urban areas. But on the other hand, if the
economy does not grow fast enough, or if it declines, China is likely to face a serious
pressure in employment.
In 1997, China’s urban labor market provided some 200 million jobs (State
Statistical Bureau 1998). Can it provide 343 million in 2020 (the demand shown in the
conservative scenario)? Based on the experience of 1989-1993, the employment
elasticity, measured by the employment growth rate divided by the economic growth
rate, was about 0.17 (Yang 1997:22). At the end of 1990s Mo (1999:236) believes that
the coefficient has already declined to 0.1-0.11. Let’s suppose that the employment
elasticity will stay within the ranges of 0.1 to 0.17 for the following 20 years. By the
end of 2020, China would then need to have an economic growth rate of double digits to
accommodate total urban labor supply, which is obviously a difficult target. Of course
the problem would disappear if the coefficient of employment elasticity could be
increased. But given the trend that economic growth relies more and more on
technology advancement than labor input, the rise of the coefficient of employment
elasticity is less likely to happen. The most possible solution seems to be reducing the
labor supply by adjusting its influential factors.
About the labor supply adjustment
The increase in urban labor supply in our forecast is the joint result of transition in
speed, size, and pattern of the influential factors, namely, fertility, mortality, migration,
higher education and engagement of housework. The in-depth analysis on the causes of
labor dynamic indicates that, among the five influential factors, the last three are
anticipated to be the most effective variables to adjust the future labor supply. To
control the urban immigrants is to control the major source of urban labor increment.
The expansion in higher education participation would reduce labor supply by delaying
the entrance of young people into the labor market, while the change in female labor
force participation patterns would modify female labor supply significantly. Due to the
continuation of the Family Planning Programme and the limitation in further reducing
the already low mortality level, fertility and mortality are not likely to play significant
roles in the future labor change.
26
However, these three effective factors may be equally important in adjusting labor
supply. They differ from each other in their influential power over labor demand.
According to some economists, the growth of urban immigration creates labor
opportunities (China Daily, January 20, 1999). Thus it becomes a debating question, if
the tension in the urban labor market can be eased by controlling rural immigration.
While the function of the two other factors -- the expansion in higher education
participation and the change in female labor force participation from the plateau pattern
to the M-pattern -- looks simpler, they will decrease labor supply without reducing labor
demand. However, the difficulties in expanding higher education should not be
underestimated. It is not just the economic factors such as tutoring fees and capital that
matters. It involves an accumulation of human capital and system reforms as well. For
example, the training of teachers, which is the precondition for education to expand,
tends to take 5 to 10 years. If the salaries were attractive, China could solve the shortage
of university teachers by employing international human resources. But given the low
salary level in China, this is less likely to be an immediate solution. The radical
expansion in 1999 in admission without enlarging the capacity of education has already
received some inquiries and complaints (China Youth Daily, October14, 1999).
The transition of the labor participation pattern is expected to only influence the
female labor force and is built on two conditions. The first is the salary system, in which
not only the capable employee gets better pay, but also a payment high enough to
support a family. The second is the establishment of a National Social Security System
so that it is no longer necessary for a family to have double employment to deal with
uncertainty during the social transition.
About the influence beyond the labor market
It must be noted that urbanization, transitions in higher education and engagement in
housework will not only impact the labor market, but also China’s socioeconomic life,
including the change of women’s lifestyles, a re-division of the family labor force, as
well as the pattern of childcare in the future. An important task for social scientists and
authorities is to foresee and to prepare for these changes.
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Appendix
Figure A1. Population age pyramid of urban China, 1995, base year.
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Figure A2. Population age pyramid of urban China, 2020, according to the conservative
scenario.
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Figure A3. Population age pyramid of urban China, 2020, according to the moderate
scenario.
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Figure A4. Population age pyramid of urban China, 2020, according to the radical
scenario.
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Figure A5. Population age pyramid of urban China, 2020, according to the “zero-
change” scenario.
